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The Court of Justice of the European Union issued its much-anticipated decisions on two requests for preliminary
rulings concerning whether the prohibition on wearing headscarves at the workplace constitutes discrimination (C-
188/15 Asma Bougnaoui, ADDH v. Micropole SA and C-157/15 Achbita v. G4S Secure Solutions NV ). The decisions
are carefully written and trying to set out refined criteria, which would define the permissibility of limiting employees’
headscarves at work. In both cases the court held that limitations on employees’ religious headscarves can be
acceptable if they are based on an internal policy of political, philosophical or religious neutrality set by the
employer. Nevertheless, they are rather disappointing as they are not providing enough guidance to the national
courts concerning the criteria that they need to take into consideration in their attempts to find a balance between
the rights in conflict. The judgments do not provide any criteria for the admissibility of dress codes other than that
they should be neutral and objectively justified. Even those terms though are not analysed by the court in a
sufficient manner.
In Asma Boungnaoui the preliminary ruling involved the interpretation of Article 4(1) of Council Directive 2000/78/EC
of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation (OJ
2000 L 303, p. 16). Ms Boungnaoui is a design engineer working for a private company in France. As part of her
work duties she had to provide her services in the customers’ premises. The customer complained that her
headscarf had upset some of its employees. Article 4(1) of the directive allows Member States to provide that a
difference in treatment based on one of the forbidden criteria of discrimination is not discriminatory if it constitutes a
“genuine and determining occupational requirement, provided that the objective is legitimate and the requirement is
proportionate”. Although the CJEU notes the need to interpret exceptions to the principle against discrimination
narrowly, it indicates that even a broad exception would be acceptable if presented as an occupational requirement
objectively dictated by the “nature” of the duties of the employee. Nevertheless, the Court must be praised for not
accepting that the wishes of the customer could constitute such an objective criterion (C-188/15 Asma Bougnaoui,
ADDH v. Micropole SA).
In the second preliminary ruling Ms Achbita, was a receptionist who was dismissed by her employer for violating an
unwritten rule that workers should not wear visible signs of their political, philosophical or religious beliefs in the
workplace. In this decision the CJEU should be praised for noting that even a neutral policy can constitute indirect
discrimination. It is not inconceivable, the CJEU notes, that the referring court may conclude that an apparently
neutral policy may constitute indirect discrimination on the basis of religion when it “results, in fact, in persons
adhering to a particular religion or belief being put at a particular disadvantage” (C-157/15 Achbita, Centrom voor
galijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding v. G4S Secure Solutions NV, Arrêt n° 630 du 9 avril 2015 (13-
19.855). Indirect discrimination exists if there is no legitimate justification for the neutral policy. Nevertheless it held
that the desire to display in relations with both public and private sector customers a policy of political, philosophical
or religious neutrality must be considered legitimate, provided that the policy is genuinely pursued in a consistent
and systematic manner and the prohibition must be strictly necessary to achieve the aim pursued. The court seems
to be accepting a very broad definition of what constitutes “objective justification”. In fact this definition is much
broader compared to what would justify a similar policy in the US. 
US federal antidiscrimination law largely inspired the EU antidiscrimination directives. U.S. legislation foresees the
possibility for a reasonable accommodation for religious practices (43 U.S.C.§ 2000e (j)), which does not exist in
the EU directives in the clauses protecting against discrimination on the basis of religion. The concept of reasonable
accommodation appears in the EU directives only concerning disability (Article 5 of directive 2000/78/EC – 42
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U.S.C. § 12112). The concept of “reasonable accommodation” guides the courts to look for ways to reconcile both
the requirements of the employer and the rights of the employee. Although the term does not exist in the text of the
directives as such, the courts could have referred to it as a tool of interpretation in order to strike a fair balance
between the crucial interests at stake. It could have considered that it is a principle that is dictated by the logic of the
directive as a whole in order to combat discrimination. In cases of conflicts of rights courts usually refer to
intermediate concepts that help them strike a balance. The principle of reasonable accommodation, just like the
principle of practical harmonization are principles embedded within the European legal culture which help courts find
a solution to similar cases of righs in conflict.
The absence of a clause about reasonable accommodation in the text of the E.U. directive indicates less sensibility
in Europe in favour of protecting freedom of religion, than in the US. Existing case law in the U.S. confirms this
hypothesis. Courts usually will evaluate neutral dress policies in reference to the principle of reasonable
accommodation, that is in reference to the need to find a solution that might be able to reconcile the conflicting
interests at stake. Even neutral blanket bans as the ones at stake in the cases before the CJEU are evaluated in
reference to whether they impede excessively upon the freedom of religion of employees. Employers have an
affirmative duty to accommodate which requires them to do more than simply not discriminate (see Georg A.
Rutherglen and John J. Donohue III, Employment Discrimination Law and Theory , Foundation Press 2012, p.508).
Recently the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed this obligation (E.E.O.C. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores Inc. 575 U.S.
__ (2015). The Supreme Court held that a refusal to hire a person because the headscarf she wore pursuant to her
religious obligations conflicted with the employer’s neutral dress policy violates Title VII disparate treatment (direct
discrimination) provision. Under US Title VII employers are obliged to reasonably accommodate to “a religious
observance or practice” unless they are able to prove that there would be undue hardship on the conduct of the
employer’s business (42 U.S.C. 9§2000e(j)). The Supreme Court interpreted the law to mean that there is an
obligation for the employer to accommodate as mere neutrality is not enough (Id, at 6). Rather, the law affirmatively
obliges employers not “to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual… because of such individual’s religious
observance and practice” (Id, at 6,7). For the same Court when an applicant requires an accommodation as an
aspect of religious practice, then “it is no response that the subsequent ‘failure to hire’ was due to an otherwise
neutral policy” (Id, at 7). In other words, according to the court even “otherwise-neutral policies’” must give way to the
need for an accommodation (Id, at 7). This means that employers are obliged to accommodate religious dress in the
workplace unless there is serious obstruction with the accomplishment of the duties of the employee. For instance,
the New York City Police Department was obliged to accommodate a traffic enforcement agent by allowing him to
wear a turban on the job (see Jaggi v. New York City Police Department CHR Compl. No. M-EmC-02-1012382-E,
NY Commission on Human Rights 1498/03, Apr. 28, 2004)).
Therefore, the CJEU could have instructed the national courts to investigate whether the employers could prove that
wearing the headscarf prevents the employees from accomplishing their duties properly, or that here is a safety or
other danger to the public that can be prevented and that justifies not accommodating the right of the employee to
express her religion. Had it given such instructions it would have narrowed down even further the concept of
“objective justification” which could justify a dress policy and could have made it compatible with the need to protect
religious freedom.
The absence of a clause on reasonable accommodation for religion in the text of the E.U. directive indicates less
sensibility in Europe in favour of protecting freedom of religion than in the US. In general, freedom of religion is
protected more strictly in the U.S. than in Europe. Nevertheless, the Court could have brought it in through
interpretation as the principle of neutrality is not enough. Neutrality is a fiction, a counterfactual ideal. The states in
their attempts to implement “neutral policies” always give legal form to social rules that have emerged out of
numerous cultural influences, among others religious. Therefore, the reference to neutrality is not enough in this
context, because the understanding of neutrality is culturally defined. The risk of giving preference to one religious
group among others under the shield of “neutrality” is always present (see Ioanna Tourkochoriti “The Burka Ban:
Divergent Approaches to Freedom of Religion in France and in the U.S.A.”, 20 William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal ,
791-852, 2012). The long experience with trying to assure peaceful coexistence among various religious
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communities in the US has made courts more sensitive to employees’ needs for religious expression. This
experience can be very edifying for the EU Member States. The mechanism of accommodation is probably a good
medium to assure integration of immigrants by preventing the development of a sense of alienation (See Julius
Grey, “The Paradoxes of Reasonable Accommodation”, Options Politiques, Septembre 2007, repr. In David
Oppenheimer, Sheila R. Foster and Sora Y. Han, Comparative Equality and Anti-Discrimination Law , Foundation
Press 2012, p.36). The CJEU could have developed a more robust doctrine against religious discrimination in the
workplace. Although it does point out the danger of indirect discrimination in neutral policies, as it stands, the
decision fails to guide properly national courts in their efforts to tackle religious discrimination in the workplace. One
can only hope that national courts will be able to go further and require reasonable accommodation between the
relevant interests at stake.
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